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Summary
The pandemic is in many ways a crisis of governance. Its magnitude and 
mitigation are determined by the nature of policy responses and crisis 
management by leaders and governments, and existing socioeconomic 
inequality has led to a disproportionate impact on some groups. The 
pandemic has created a set of unique challenges that underscore the 
need for governments to collect revenue more efficiently and equitably; 
and to spend it more inclusively, transparently and accountably, especially 
on the most vulnerable and marginalised populations. It has revealed 
that many governments around the world have limited state capacity to 
respond in these ways, especially in fragile contexts, and that state–citizen 
relations may weaken as a result. 
In this paper we suggest a set of governance interventions to help create 
conditions for positive change and support efforts to build back better. 
We start by looking at two broad outcomes that governance-focused 
interventions can focus on in order to achieve transformative impact. These 
are the twin goals of building (a) effective and (b) inclusive institutions 
that are able to mitigate the impact of the crisis on all population groups, 
especially those that are the most vulnerable and marginalised. 
We then look briefly at how the goals of building effective and inclusive 
institutions will necessarily need to ensure impact in three areas: (a) 
reducing inequality, and increasing redistribution and inclusion; (b) building 
trust, accountability and legitimacy to strengthen state–citizen linkages; 
and (c) contextualising interventions based on different types of regimes 
that not only condition the impact of planned interventions, but also create 
particularly harsh pressures and dynamics in some contexts. 
We suggest in this paper that the impact of the pandemic can be dealt 
with through: (a) interventions implemented in the short term that deal with 
the immediate impact of the crisis, and that establish firm foundations for; 
(b) multilateral efforts that can transform development in the longer term.
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Key fixes in the immediate to shorter term 
include the following: 
– Easing financial pressure on vulnerable groups, 
especially informal workers, through targeted 
relief, and fiscal measures that can support 
people and businesses during the crisis.
– Building state capacity and adaptability 
by looking for context-specific windows 
of opportunity at national level, and by 
strengthening local government capacity 
to reach and engage with the most 
vulnerable and marginalised groups.
– Enabling inclusive service delivery by 
ensuring that reliable and usable data 
are readily available, and by updating 
technology and its use. 
– Enabling evidence-based policy through 
the co-construction of knowledge and 
collaborative research.
Work over the longer term should focus on 
more transformative interventions that make 
the following possible: 
– Progressive taxation that is both more 
just and effective in expanding countries’ 
revenue base.
– Policies that are more inclusive of the 
voices of vulnerable and marginalised 
groups, especially at local level; that 
include more women in their design and 
implementation; and that are made 
collaboratively with a variety of actors 
from the state, civil society and the private 
sector.
– Authorities that are more accountable, 
by creating incentives, credible tools, and 
sites for engagement between states and 
citizens. 
Introduction
This Positioning Paper on governance 
aims to provide input into Ireland’s goal of 
‘building back better’ in the aftermath of the 
coronavirus (Covid-19) crisis. It draws on the 
experience of the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) in a number of countries around 
the world, to provide insight into building more 
effective and inclusive institutions that work 
for the most vulnerable and marginalised 
populations. These population groups may be 
defined differently across contexts but will in 
most cases include women; racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities; migrant populations; and 
workers in the informal sector. 
The pandemic crisis has created a set 
of unique governance challenges: of 
governments having to spend more, but 
tax less, to bolster the economy and reduce 
the financial impact on the population; 
of governments needing to do more, 
especially on the front line, with reduced 
and affected staff; and of governments 
needing more money at a time when 
increased fragility across the world could 
mean that raising extra revenue leads to 
even greater polarisation. 
The pandemic has truly underscored 
the need to collect revenue more efficiently 
and equitably, and to spend it more 
inclusively, transparently, and accountably. 
The approaches suggested in this paper 
respond to the challenge that governments 
around the world face from needing to 
raise revenue and deliver services at a time 
of heightened fragility and increased tensions 
in state–citizen relations, with the danger 
of not being able to respond to the needs 
The pandemic has truly 
underscored the need to 
collect revenue more efficiently 
and equitably, and to spend it 
more inclusively, transparently, 
and accountably. 
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of the most vulnerable and marginalised 
populations because of limited state 
capacity.
Many of the country cases draw on fragile 
contexts that are a particular focus for 
Ireland and IDS. Fragility is a multidimensional 
concept. It can manifest dramatically as 
contexts that are affected by conflict, 
violence, famine, or disasters. It can refer more 
selectively to a particular state of social, 
economic or environmental precarity that 
some citizens find themselves in, in otherwise 
non-fragile national settings. It can also 
manifest in less dramatic ways as a general 
state of disconnection between states and 
groups of citizens, which over time may result 
in a breakdown of the social contract, leading 
to violence and conflict. The pandemic has 
increased concerns especially around the 
last two forms of fragility: groups that are 
in danger of being left furthest behind and 
weakening state–citizen linkages. 
Fragility creates vulnerability: it defines 
the composition of vulnerable and 
marginalised groups in each context. It is 
thus important to understand the particular 
and complex nature of fragility in designing 
and planning differentiated interventions 
for different countries, and even for different 
regions or groups within each country. We 
suggest here that a ‘political economy of 
fragility’ lens is particularly suited to this task 
for several reasons:
– It helps us focus our attention on the 
configuration of actors and institutions 
within such contexts, the set of incentives 
that define their behaviour, and the nature 
of contestations over power and authority. 
– It allows us to understand how political 
settlements have occurred, why certain 
groups gained power and authority while 
others were delegitimised and excluded in 
the particular process of state-building in 
each context. 
– It explains why some groups may trust 
the state and policy interventions less 
than other groups within the same 
contexts. It also helps us gain clarity on 
how these settlements may be affected or 
threatened by certain policy interventions, 
allowing us to see where constraints to 
interventions may now lie, often varying at 
subnational level. 
Research at IDS has drawn attention in 
particular to understanding ‘political economy 
from below’, in the sense of the dominant 
concerns and perspectives of marginalised 
people and those distant from centres of 
power, and drawn attention to the need to 
localise interventions.1
The fact that there is a political economy 
of fragility means that fragility does not 
simply exist – its existence serves certain 
groups’ interests. This has become a question 
of particular importance over the past 
decade as democratic and civil liberties have 
regressed across the world, not just in Africa 
and Asia, but also in Europe, Latin America, 
and North America. Governments have 
used increasingly authoritarian practices to 
impinge on citizens’ rights even in countries 
that are formally democratic. 
These practices include restrictions on 
civil society actors; reduced rights of speech, 
assembly and association; arbitrary arrests 
and the detention of political activists; 
restrictions on media; and increasing 
regulation of online spaces. There is concern 
that the current pandemic may exacerbate 
these processes. Much of the global turn 
1  See the synthesis report by Gaventa and Oswald (2019) for the Action for Empowerment and Accountability programme.
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political economy of fragility 
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towards right-wing populism over the past 
decade is attributable to the 2007/08 
financial crisis and the fragile contexts it 
created. A similar downturn now may provide 
its own set of political repercussions and 
increasing fragility as states continue to 
exercise powers gained during a state of 
national emergency to restrict the space for 
certain groups.
In this paper we suggest actions that 
might help mitigate such impacts and 
create conditions for positive change, using 
a political economy approach that allows 
us to identify the actors and institutions to 
work with, and the champions of change and 
windows of opportunity to look out for. This 
paper is structured in three sections: (1) the 
overall governance-related goals of ‘building 
back better’ interventions in the Covid-19 
crisis and its aftermath; (2) the opportunities 
and risks that the pandemic has opened up 
for governance reforms; and (3) the proposed 
approach to implementing interventions in 
these areas.
Goals of governance interventions
There are essentially two broad outcomes 
that governance-focused interventions may 
focus on in order to achieve transformative 
impact. These are the twin goals of building 
(a) effective and (b) inclusive institutions 
that are able to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis on all population groups, especially 
those who are the most vulnerable 
and marginalised, and may bear the 
disproportionate burden of the Covid-19 
crisis. The two goals essentially work together 
– effective institutions need to work for 
all, and inclusion is best achieved when 
institutions are working well – but in order 
to focus on the particular needs of each 
outcome, they are unpacked separately, and 
very briefly, below. The focus here is on the key 
considerations and questions that fall within 
each category. Applicable interventions are 
discussed in a later section. 
Building effective institutions that can 
reach and adequately serve all parts of the 
population: The focus here is on institutions 
that have (a) the administrative reach and 
capacity; (b) requisite information and 
data on population groups; and (c) are well 
resourced. These may seem fairly obvious, 
but they continue to define the major 
challenges people face in countries around 
the world, especially in more fragile contexts. 
We suggest that more attention needs to 
be focused on the following key questions in 
responding to the crisis: 
Capacity and adaptability:
– Are bureaucratic processes and capacities 
set up to ensure quick responses, 
adaptability, and effective decision-
making? 
– Do local governments have the capacity 
to respond to the needs of the most 
vulnerable and marginalised population 
groups through contextualised solutions?
Data, evidence, and information and 
communication technology (ICT) solutions:
– To what extent do bureaucracies have the 
ability to access and analyse good data 
(or work with networks of researchers) for 
evidence-based solutions, especially on 
exclusion and vulnerability?
– How can expanding technologies be 
harnessed to improve data and for a more 
connected government, especially at local 
level?
Public financial management and taxation:
– How can governments raise revenues 
without disproportionately burdening 
those who may be worst affected? 
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– How can the regressive impact of various 
taxes and user fees be avoided during 
this crisis, and what are the opportunities 
for lobbying for more progressive taxation 
through country offices or multilateral efforts?
Building inclusive institutions that deliver 
services equitably: the focus here is 
on (a) inclusive decision-making and 
responsiveness; (b) gender equity; and 
(c) transparency and accountability. Power 
dynamics are important considerations 
across all contexts – in democratic or 
more authoritarian regimes, and in high-
income and lower-income countries. A key 
consideration in building inclusive institutions 
is to pay attention to where decisions are 
made, who gets to participate in these 
forums, and whose knowledge matters 
in crafting policy responses. Some key 
questions in this area are: 
Inclusive decision-making, especially for 
women and marginalised groups:
– How should interventions be designed 
and run in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings to ensure that the poorest or most 
marginalised people are not excluded from 
‘building back better’ efforts?
– Which measures can lead to the 
feminisation of public spaces in terms of 
staff and agendas? 
– How can collective action and inclusive 
decision-making be encouraged at the 
local level?
Accountability and transparency:
– How can state–citizen linkages be 
strengthened, especially in terms of 
institutional trust and the legitimacy of 
government decisions and efforts?
– How can the power of technology be 
harnessed while avoiding technology’s 
tendency to further marginalise the most 
vulnerable population groups because of 
differential access? 
– To what extent does the political context, 
especially in terms of regime types, matter 
to the needs of building back better, and 
how might such contexts be navigated? 
Opportunities and risks created by 
Covid-19
As a ‘critical juncture’, we can expect that 
Covid-19 will re-order a number of relationships. 
In many ways, the pandemic is a crisis of 
governance: existing socioeconomic inequality 
has meant that it has disproportionately 
impacted some groups more than others, 
and both its magnitude and mitigation are 
determined to a great extent by the nature of 
policy responses and crisis management by 
leaders and governments. It has thrown into 
sharp relief that the goals of building effective 
and inclusive institutions will necessarily need to 
manage impact in three areas. These are listed 
briefly here, with suggested interventions to 
address them in the following section. 
Impact on inequality, redistribution 
and inclusion
Inequality is regularly cited as one of the most 
important determinants of the magnitude of 
the pandemic’s impact. There is now enough 
evidence to show that Covid-19 has impacted 
A key consideration in building 
inclusive institutions is to pay 
attention to where decisions 
are made, who gets to 
participate in these forums, 
and whose knowledge matters 
in crafting policy responses. 
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certain population groups more than others. 
Minority groups in some countries, such as 
the UK and the US, and poorer groups who 
live in dense slums and informal settlements in 
different parts of the world, are more affected 
by the pandemic and its social and economic 
repercussions. There are also reports from 
across the world of women facing harsher 
living conditions and domestic violence during 
the pandemic. There is evidence that informal 
workers in many African countries are not only 
taking up new unregulated loans in order 
to survive lockdowns, but also negotiating 
advance payments from their employers, 
raising the risk of bonded labour. 
Policy implementation is deeply embedded 
in unequal social and economic structures 
and relations. We need to be aware of the 
moments and environments where policy 
implementation ends up reproducing and 
exacerbating existing inequalities to avoid 
the danger of some groups being left furthest 
behind. We can also use this moment as an 
opportunity – the fact that Covid-19 has 
brought the impact of glaring socioeconomic 
inequalities into sharp relief should help us 
design inclusive interventions that explicitly 
recognise and close these gaps. 
Impact on trust, accountability and 
legitimacy
There is initial suggestive evidence that the 
pandemic has revealed trust deficits, testing 
already fragile relationships between states 
and citizens in many countries, and calling 
into question the extent to which states are 
accountable to citizens. Citizens in China 
and Pakistan have expressed frustration 
at the lack of transparency in government 
decision-making. Leaders in Brazil, Tanzania 
and the US have appeared dismissive of the 
gravity of the crisis even as it has affected 
large proportions of their populations, at 
least in Brazil and the US. State aid in India 
is conditional on workers having ration cards 
that many do not possess. And leaders in 
Madagascar, the US and elsewhere have 
peddled untested medicines and remedies to 
suffering populations. 
As cases rise across Asia and Africa in the 
aftermath of countries opening up post-
lockdown, there is a sense that governments 
have chosen to set up a false dichotomy 
between health risks and livelihoods, rather 
than choosing to strengthen social protection 
measures. Conversely, in Europe the pandemic 
seems to have weakened the appeal of 
far-right parties that have tried to politicise 
government responses to the pandemic, 
with recent reports suggesting that their 
popularity has declined as trust in the 
effectiveness of state responses has increased 
(Samaras 2020). 
Citizens’ trust in institutions may gain 
further salience in the aftermath of the 
pandemic, based on how governments 
respond to a growing financial and economic 
crisis. In many parts of the world, institutional 
trust is characteristically low, and may now 
have been pushed further downwards 
based either on indecisive action by the 
state or on the lack of resources with which 
to respond. For example, in some areas in 
India, communities are informally raising 
revenue to continue providing midday meals 
to students who are no longer receiving 
them in school through state programmes. 
Low institutional trust has implications for 
the adoption of interventions and recovery 
programmes that governments may now 
want to adopt. This is not an area in which 
donors can run direct interventions. Trust is 
connected to organisational characteristics of 
We need to be aware of the 
moments and environments 
where policy implementation 
ends up reproducing and 
exacerbating existing 
inequalities to avoid the 
danger of some groups being 
left furthest behind. 
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bureaucracies, mechanisms of accountability, 
transparency of budgetary processes, and 
the institutional reach of the state through 
local governance, where there may be greater 
room to effect positive change.
Impact on governance and politics 
across regime types
A related concern is that as governments’ 
reach and data collection increase, so might 
their intrusion on and repression of certain 
population groups and activities. Better use 
of technology can ensure that governments 
reach larger parts of the population, 
especially under social distancing measures. 
But at the same time it may also serve to 
increase state surveillance at a time when 
civic spaces were already shrinking across 
parts of the world. The past decade has 
seen democratically elected governments 
on all continents curtail civil liberties. Whether 
the pandemic will strengthen the trend 
of ‘autocratisation’ or force it to reverse 
as disillusionment with right-wing and 
populist regimes sets in remains to be seen. 
In the meantime, institutional changes that 
strengthen state capacity for delivering 
services may impact regime behaviour in 
other spheres as well. How decisions are made 
will vary across countries where there is a 
populist ‘strong man’ (Tanzania, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, the US), a strong party (Argentina, 
China, Mozambique, Vietnam) or some level 
of deliberation within the ruling elites. These 
are important contextual conditions that will 
impact the design and interventions of donor 
programmes. 
Proposed approach
We suggest dealing with the thematic 
areas above by thinking in terms of two 
categories of interventions: (a) those that can 
be implemented in the short term both to 
deal with the immediate impact of the crisis 
and lay the foundations for building back 
better; and (b) transforming development 
in the longer term through more multilateral 
efforts to reorient development policy. The 
suggestions below provide key considerations 
to guide possible ways forward, but the scope 
for action will be determined by the resources 
and space available for effecting change in 
different contexts. 
Shorter-term fixes
Key fixes in the immediate to shorter term 
should focus on the financial needs of the 
most vulnerable populations, and on enabling 
state departments and politicians to be able 
to respond to them through relevant decision-
making that is updated and supported by 
evidence. Key areas include the following:
– Easing financial pressure on vulnerable 
groups.
– Building state capacity and adaptability.
– Enabling inclusive service delivery by 
improving access to data and ICT.
– Enabling evidence-based policy through 
engaged research.
As governments’ reach and 
data collection increase, so 
might their intrusion on and 
repression of certain 
population groups and 
activities. 
Key fixes in the immediate to 
shorter term should focus on 
the financial needs of the 
most vulnerable populations. 
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Easing financial pressure on vulnerable 
groups 
The crisis has created an unprecedented 
situation of higher spending needs (both for 
the immediate crisis and for building stronger 
health-care systems in the longer term) and 
reduced revenue (because of the global 
economic slowdown and tax relief). Tax 
policy and fiscal measures to support people 
and businesses during the crisis have thus 
become key policy areas under discussion in 
many countries, especially as concerns have 
grown around governments’ ability to expand 
fiscal space to strengthen social protection 
measures for those furthest behind. 
While governments in emerging 
economies do not have the same fiscal 
space as those in more developed countries, 
almost all of them have provided some form 
of tax relief, ranging from extending filing 
deadlines to reducing tax rates, or exempting 
particular groups altogether. For many tax-
registered small and medium businesses, tax 
relief might make the difference between 
going bankrupt or staying afloat. However, a 
large number of people and businesses are 
outside of the tax net, and therefore are 
naturally not affected by such measures; for 
example, in Kenya only 12 per cent of the 
workforce are active payers of personal 
income tax, and in Rwanda only 3 per cent 
(Moore 2020). 
Those unaffected by such measures 
are also likely to be the most vulnerable 
groups: informal workers, street vendors, etc. 
(Gallien and van den Boogaard 2020a). The 
most important form of relief in low-income 
countries will necessarily be on the spending 
side, through cash transfers and other forms 
of support to households, workers and 
businesses, at the national and local levels. 
Many government relief efforts of this 
variety have, however, been tied to formal 
institutionalised relationships and have not 
gone far enough in helping informal workers, 
who make up approximately three-fifths 
of the global workforce. Their vulnerability 
has multiple dimensions: their access to 
health services is often limited while 
working conditions are less regulated and 
safe; their savings are low and their 
inability to work from home has left them 
particularly vulnerable to the economic 
shock of this crisis. 
Many states have instituted unconditional 
cash transfers, targeting low-income groups 
that have included informal workers. While this 
has been an effective measure in providing 
some support, targeting mechanisms have 
often been imprecise. In India, for example, 
some state aid has been conditional on 
workers having ration cards, which many 
migrant labourers had left in their home states. 
At other times, efforts are constrained by a 
lack of data and information. Efforts also 
need to be gendered, given that the crisis 
Expanding cash transfer 
programmes
The Government of Pakistan responded 
to the economic impact of the 
pandemic by providing monthly cash 
transfers to 12 million poor families (and 
eventually, by some accounts, 17 million). 
It was able to do so quickly because 
Pakistan already had a well-established 
social safety net system under the 
Benazir Income Support Programme, 
one of South Asia’s largest social 
protection programmes, which already 
covered four million poor women. It used 
this available national database and an 
established system of registration and 
payment mechanisms to expand quickly 
under the relabelled Ehsaas programme, 
with the government committing to 
provide £577m in additional funding. 
However, by some accounts, this still 
falls short of providing for the estimated 
25 million households that may require 
such assistance in the aftermath of the 
pandemic, both in terms of resources 
and because the current database may 
not be able to identify the additional 
households.
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has disproportionately impacted informal 
women workers.2
As Social Protection and Building Back 
Better (Lind, Roelen and Sabates-Wheeler 
2020) argues, the Covid-19 crisis presents 
an opportunity not just to expand social 
protection in the short term but to establish 
firm foundations for more comprehensive 
systems in the long run. Donors can provide 
support that strengthens and expands 
government cash transfer programmes, 
either on their own or in collaboration with 
other international agencies, by enabling 
coverage of a larger proportion of the 
population, or by improving targeting 
systems and databases. 
Building state capacity and adaptability
States’ ability to respond on the spending 
side is tied to their capacity to coordinate 
responses and adapt current practices 
around the crisis. This matters not just 
for the immediate response, but also for 
longer-term recovery efforts. The differences 
between government responses – especially 
in terms of how they make, implement 
and communicate decisions – are likely to 
become more pronounced as the long-term 
effects of the pandemic become apparent.
 
Facilitating rapid and enforced bureaucratic 
adaptation: In a rapidly changing and highly 
uncertain situation, states’ ability to adapt 
is critical. Adaptation in a crisis is different 
from at other times. Governments have no 
choice but to adapt and they have little time 
to reflect on the best response. Adaptation 
is inevitable, but the effectiveness of such 
adaptation is not. The need to act quickly 
increases the danger that organisations will 
fall back into their institutional comfort zone, 
favouring policy approaches in which they 
have prior experience – building back the 
same, rather than building back better. 
Much of this depends on the context in 
which bureaucracies operate: on bureaucratic 
rules and systems, levels of competition 
between different organisations within it, 
competing societal interests and so on (Sharp 
and Harrison 2020). The scope to make such 
adaptations will vary between countries, 
depending on how the bureaucracy is 
regulated and managed; for example, how 
quickly financial resources may be redeployed, 
the extent of centralisation and the nature of 
political influence on the bureaucracy. 
Although many studies suggest that 
adaptation in lower-income countries exists 
mostly in ‘islands of effectiveness’ (Crook 2010) 
or is facilitated by donor interventions, examples 
of bureaucratic adaptation can be found in 
many areas of government activity. India’s 
efforts to promote energy efficiency have been 
implemented at the subnational level through 
institutions set up for different purposes, such as 
promoting renewable energy in rural areas. 
China’s approach to adaptive 
development has been described as 
‘directed improvisation’, highlighting the 
importance of allowing for experimentation 
in achieving national objectives (Ang 2016). 
Management of the Covid-19 response 
drew on local branches of the Chinese 
Communist Party and a grid management 
system going back to the Mao era, 
adapted for current needs. It is possible 
that more such efforts may now become 
visible in other countries, too, and may 
present a particularly conducive entry 
point for designing future interventions.
2  See ILO (2020) for a discussion on women in the informal sector in India.
The need to act quickly 
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Rapid and enforced adaptation requires 
governments to reflect quickly on evidence, 
reach appropriate conclusions and 
communicate them effectively, often based 
on information that is both limited and liable 
to change. In this context, decisions are 
likely to be influenced as much by instinct 
as by evidence. The question then becomes 
whose instinct is trusted, who influences and 
informs decision-making, which decisions 
are likely to be taken through informal 
channels and which are likely to require 
formal approval. 
To take account of these considerations, 
donors will themselves need to ‘think and 
work politically’ (Dasandi, Marquette and 
Robinson 2016) to judge when to engage with 
formal processes, such as the development 
of budgets, policies or regulations, and 
when to engage with key influencers or 
decision makers, such as individual leaders, 
bureaucrats or specific organisations.
Building capacity of local governments: 
The pandemic has shown the importance 
of local context related to both epidemic 
control measures and the impact of those 
control measures on social and economic 
outcomes. Local governments have been at 
the forefront of efforts against Covid-19. They 
have had to respond through local health 
systems, caring for frontline workers, as well 
as ensuring compliance with lockdowns and 
social distancing measures. However, local 
authorities are also the level of government 
that is usually most constrained in terms of 
resources, capacity and access to good data. 
State capacity and the adaptability of 
frontline workers and ‘street-level’ bureaucrats 
are of particular importance in a context 
in which demand for their work has risen 
while their numbers have diminished due to 
illness, shielding, or self-isolation. Different 
governments are currently trying different 
approaches depending on their context: 
some countries have redeployed municipal 
staff across departments; others have 
enhanced linkages with civil society actors, 
either creating small armies of volunteers 
or working with local non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in the field; while 
countries with strong one-party rule have 
further increased frontline workers’ strong 
connection with local ruling party cadres.
Efforts to build back better could be a 
way to empower and re-resource vital local 
government services. There are a number of 
ways that local governments’ ability to deal 
To centralise or not to centralise 
decision-making?
Argentina’s effective response to 
Covid-19, especially in comparison to its 
regional neighbours Brazil and Mexico, 
is credited to the governors within its 
federated system having less fiscal 
power in relation to the centre. This has 
ensured a more uniform response on 
imposing a country-wide lockdown, 
compared to Brazil or Mexico where 
state governors have instituted measures 
of varying effectiveness. Effectiveness 
is, of course, dependent on the advice 
being received from the centre. In Brazil, 
it was because of the greater power 
of state governors that they were able 
to challenge or disregard President 
Jair Bolsonaro’s reluctance to impose 
lockdowns (Giraudy, Niedzwiecki and 
Pribble 2020).3
3 These authors have detailed articles on these dynamics, but for a quick Covid-19-related summary, see Giraudy, Niedzwiecki 
and Pribble (2020).
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with citizens’ needs can be strengthened, 
especially in the aftermath of a crisis. Key 
within these is strengthening their capacity to 
reach and engage with the most vulnerable 
and marginalised groups within their 
jurisdictions. This involves: (a) providing local 
governments with access to reliable and 
updated information; and (b) training them 
on how to equitably aggregate demands 
from across diverse population groups, how to 
collect and process information, and how to 
design effective responses. 
This is particularly important for newer 
or redeployed frontline staff who do not 
have the advantage of the intuition of 
more experienced staff, and so might resort 
to heuristic thinking based on biases and 
profiling in dealing with vulnerable groups. 
Based on our work with local governments, 
training modules that may be particularly 
valued by local staff include those on 
strengthening and promoting the role of 
women in council procedures; gender and 
social budgeting; structure and forms of 
exclusion in different parts of the country, and 
connected to this, mechanisms for inclusion; 
and how to mobilise and work with vulnerable 
and marginalised communities.
Strengthening systems at the local level in 
a select group of subregions or municipalities 
is an obvious point of entry for donors such as 
Ireland. However, context-specific decisions 
using a political economy lens will need to 
determine whether such local efforts may be 
more conducive than changes effected at the 
centre, such as through civil service training 
academies. 
Enabling inclusive service delivery by 
improving access to data and ICT
Making reliable and usable data readily 
available: Information can play a vital role 
in getting relief and services to the most 
marginalised populations, and to monitor 
how effective various relief packages actually 
are. For example, effectively targeting cash 
transfers and other benefits at those people 
who need them most (especially without 
needing formal documentation, which the 
most vulnerable often lack) requires that 
governments have complete, up-to-date and 
usable data on the entire population. This is 
often not available in low-income countries. 
Data are scarce, irregularly collected and 
often hard to match across units. Local 
governments may hold data for differently 
defined units from those used by higher-tier 
state departments, while the census office 
may use an altogether different demarcation. 
It may sometimes take weeks (if not longer) 
to reconcile all this information in effective and 
usable formats, and can be a real constraint 
during emergencies. Even where good data 
exist, they may be governed by unnecessary 
red tape or secrecy laws, leading agencies 
and civil society actors to spend time and 
resources replicating them. The lack of good-
quality, easily accessible and disaggregated 
data can constrain the work of government 
departments. But, equally, it affects the ability 
of other groups, such as civil society actors 
or the private sector, to play their part in 
recovery efforts. 
Donor interventions can help build 
government capacity to collect regular and 
reliable information in usable formats that are 
available to everyone, especially in relation 
to enabling the identification of vulnerable 
population groups. Indeed, this is often cited 
as one of the most-needed and effective 
interventions. But information is political, 
and interventions that seek to provide more 
accessible and complete data to citizens 
may find opponents in state institutions. Such 
Donor interventions can help 
build government capacity to 
collect regular and reliable 
information in usable formats 
that are available to everyone, 
especially in relation to 
enabling the identification of 
vulnerable population groups. 
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interventions will require using a political 
economy approach that can identify 
champions as well as roadblocks. 
Updating technology and its use to 
improve state–citizen linkages: A related 
issue is the use of technology and the extent 
to which different state departments and 
agencies have had access to technology 
or the capacity to shift to using it under 
lockdown and social distancing rules. 
Countries where cash payments and face-
to-face interactions with state officials are the 
norm have struggled to develop alternative 
strategies quickly. However, those that had 
already introduced ICT solutions, such as 
allowing e-filing and e-payments for taxes 
and service user fees, had an easier time 
maintaining essential operations during 
lockdown and after. 
There is a sense that the availability of 
ICT solutions will determine differences in tax 
compliance during the Covid-19 crisis, as well 
as the extent to which central governments 
are able to coordinate action with regional/
provincial and local governments. Countries 
with more developed data repository 
systems and better ICT will find themselves 
better placed to manage the impact of 
the crisis – by being able to access data 
from a wider range of sources and to do so 
rapidly – and those without will have strong 
incentives to start building capacity. The 
spread of mobile phones and the popularity 
of social media across the world mean 
that technology can also be used to set 
up complaint mechanisms and follow-up 
systems that can help better connect states 
and citizens. 
Developing ICT solutions requires a 
substantial availability of skills, as well as 
extensive sensitisation campaigns to inform 
service users about new facilities. Donors 
could play an important role in building the 
technological capability for this, which could 
also provide more long-term benefits in 
terms of improving government coordination. 
In doing so, it is important to be aware 
that technology and e-governance can 
sometimes entrench marginalisation by 
playing up differential access across groups. 
This is both because marginalised populations 
have limited access to the internet, computers 
and mobile phones, and because the 
format in which governments communicate 
information may not be accessible to more 
vulnerable populations.
Enabling evidence-based policy through 
engaged research
Our understanding of how states function, 
especially in low-income countries, has 
largely ignored the question of how and to 
what extent they make use of scientific data, 
evidence and expertise. Equally worrying is 
the origin of these data and evidence, and 
that they may often be unreliable and of 
poor quality (Jerven 2013). A key intervention 
in building state capacity would be to 
enable evidence-driven policy solutions by 
increasing engaged research that focuses 
on understanding processes of change 
and transformation. It is important not just 
to expand the evidence and knowledge 
base for transformative policy, but also to 
communicate this knowledge in usable 
formats to relevant policy audiences. 
This is a short-term and ongoing 
investment that will support longer-term 
goals of transforming development thinking, 
and involves two specific challenges. The first 
challenge is to expand the sources from which 
governments receive scientific advice. In some 
countries this may be heavily influenced by 
power dynamics, norms, belief systems and 
even patronage networks – the ‘political 
economy of knowledge’. The issue here is 
It is important not just to 
expand the evidence and 
knowledge base for 
transformative policy, but 
also to communicate this 
knowledge in usable formats 
to relevant policy audiences. 
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to not just connect governments to more 
credible sources that produce more rigorous 
evidence, but to also consider why such 
information is not accessed already and how 
these constraints may be dismantled. 
Possible entry points range from 
developing training programmes that 
enhance the interface between policy 
researchers and policymakers – both training 
researchers to better communicate with 
policymakers, as well as training policymakers 
to better access and use evidence – to 
co-constructing knowledge and evidence 
through collaborative research, such as that 
between researchers and revenue authorities 
in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda.4 
The second challenge is to ensure that 
policy solutions are deeply contextualised, 
especially in their understanding of fragility 
and the vulnerabilities it creates. The 
pandemic and the response to it has 
stimulated context-specific discourse on 
public expectations of authorities, crucial 
trade-offs, and the interests at play in how 
the post-Covid future is imagined. 
Understanding these contextual factors 
requires sharper and more rapid political and 
social analysis that takes greater account of 
public discourse and popular claims. 
The ‘political economy of fragility’ or 
‘political economy from below’ approaches 
outlined earlier are of particular importance 
here. Policy responses that fail to understand 
shifts in the content of the social contract or 
moral economy are likely to fail, at least in 
terms of popular legitimacy. Moreover, this 
kind of analysis is critical to understanding 
how policy initiatives conceived at the 
centre are likely to ‘land’ at the local level. 
Collaboration between donors, policymakers 
and researchers – especially those based 
in local universities and thinktanks – is key 
to such efforts and should be incentivised 
through small projects that draw them 
together in finding solutions to policy 
challenges. 
Transforming development in the 
longer term
Work over the longer term should focus on 
more transformative interventions to create 
systems of governance that are more just and 
equitable – both in terms of how governments 
collect revenue and how they spend it – and 
that protect all population groups against 
the adverse impacts of future crises. These 
interventions would benefit from coordinated 
multilateral efforts, including advocacy, and 
from reaching broad global consensus on 
common goals for the type of world we want 
to live in. They include the following: 
– Progressive taxation
– Inclusive and networked decision-making
– Accountable authorities.
4  See McCluskey and Nakukwago Isingoma (2017) for details of this collaboration.
Co-constructing evidence on 
tax education and compliance 
in Rwanda
Researchers at the International Centre 
for Tax and Development (ICTD) based 
at IDS undertook a research project in 
partnership with the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA) to evaluate the effect of 
their taxpayer education programme 
on knowledge, perceptions and 
compliance. The study demonstrated 
that attending a single tax education 
training session had a significant effect 
on the probability of tax declaration, 
and also on building the habit of tax 
compliance, which can lead to revenue 
gains over time. The study led to 
changes in the RRA’s taxpayer education 
programme based on the recognition 
that the lack of specific types of 
information, such as on penalties for 
late filing, leads to non-compliance 
by taxpayers. It also led to changes 
in the type and extent of information 
provided to new taxpayers at the point 
of registration.
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Progressive taxation
Taxing equitably means taxing the rich: 
As governments across the world seek to 
raise additional revenue to deal with the 
costs of the crisis, there are concerns that 
the informal sector is likely to become the 
target of new efforts to raise public revenue 
in the medium term. In some countries, such 
as Algeria, this has already been part of 
the government discourse on financing 
the recovery – President Abdelmadjid 
Tebboune identified money in the informal 
sector as a key revenue opportunity for the 
state (Hamadi 2020). Expanding taxation of 
the informal sector not only introduces an 
additional burden on economic sectors that 
have been hit hardest by the crisis, but it is 
also inefficient. Revenue potential is limited 
because it targets small-scale taxpayers, 
market traders and street vendors, while 
transaction costs are high. Additional 
revenue raised may do little more than pay 
the salaries of the tax collectors (Gallien and 
van den Boogaard 2020b).
Instead, guided by an equity principle, 
governments should focus on taxing the rich, 
who are often largely untaxed. Recent research 
has shown that many high net worth individuals 
(HNWIs) in Africa are not registered taxpayers 
and, even when they are, they do not pay 
all the tax that they should, by law, be liable 
for. The Covid-19 crisis presents a compelling 
case for governments to focus on taxes that 
target the richest segments of society, such 
as property taxes or personal income tax, 
while exempting other groups through the 
introduction of minimum thresholds: research 
suggests that exempting the bottom 50 per 
cent from property tax payment would only 
reduce revenue by 10–15 per cent. Some argue 
that this could also be extended to up to 80 
per cent of households being exempted from 
taxes during a crisis (Moore and Pritchard 2020). 
Instead of introducing new taxes, such as 
those on wealth, governments in low-income 
countries should start implementing tax laws 
that are already in place and which would 
bear down proportionally more on the rich. 
This is more politically feasible, has a strong 
equity rationale, and could face relatively 
less resistance from elites than trying to 
introduce new policies. Tax revenue from the 
rich has proved to be a good and stable 
source of funding in countries that have 
tapped it. Uganda, one of the few African 
countries to actively engage in taxing HNWIs, 
collected over US$5.5m within the first year 
of establishing an HNWI unit. Other countries 
have much to learn from this experience, and 
donors can help advocate for such changes 
by disseminating information and helping 
governments set up such units.5
Progressive tax measures for climate 
change and the private sector: This may 
also be a good time to introduce taxes on 
damaging carbon emissions and other 
pollutants that are long overdue. They 
could be designed to raise new revenue for 
governments through businesses that have 
been stable or even grown during this time, 
while minimising costs to more vulnerable 
households or businesses through rebates or 
other supports. As part of multilateral donor 
efforts, arguments should be made around the 
need for a ‘new deal’ on international taxation 
that is simpler, more cooperative and more 
inclusive of developing countries.6
Inclusive and networked decision-making
Inclusive governance speaks to two distinct 
but related processes: (a) ensuring that the 
voices of vulnerable and marginalised groups 
are heard within decision-making arenas to 
ensure that policies work for them; and 
(b) that decisions are made collaboratively 
Guided by an equity principle, 
governments should focus on 
taxing the rich, who are often 
largely untaxed. 
5  See Kangave et al. (2018) for details of the Uganda case.
6  See Christensen (2020) and Moore and Prichard (2020) to read more on this.
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with a variety of actors from the state, civil 
society and the private sector. 
Inclusion of marginalised voices, especially 
at the local level: Vulnerabilities may be 
exacerbated in the aftermath of the Covid-19 
crisis if certain groups are unable to make 
individual or collective claims on the state. 
Job losses, restrictions on mobility, and 
reduced space for participating in public life 
during the pandemic may have longer-term 
impacts: on people’s ability to organise; on 
household and community relations; and 
on attitudes towards service delivery, civic 
and spontaneous action, and social and 
institutional trust. Local governments are 
especially well placed to connect states 
and citizens, and to plan inclusively because 
mechanisms for the inclusion of marginalised 
groups in decision-making processes can 
vary by context and the particular politics 
of exclusion. What works in one place may 
not work effectively in another, and what 
may work well for one excluded population 
group may not work for another. Such 
variation reduces the value of centralised 
planning and requires more contextualised 
and differentiated policy responses, possibly 
designed at lower tiers of government – but 
this is where capacity is lowest. 
Local governments’ ability to inclusively 
aggregate demands through locally elected 
representatives, and ensure that these match 
the objectives and design of local public 
service delivery, can be strengthened either 
through the reform of local government 
systems or through capacity building.7 The 
formation of cross-party groups and alliances 
within local governments can ensure better 
aggregation and representation of citizens’ 
demands in decisions, especially in contexts 
where local governance is polarised by party 
politics. Lind and colleagues make similar 
arguments about the need to strengthen local 
governance to help extend the reach of social 
protection (see Social Protection and Building 
Back Better – Lind et al. 2020).
Donor agencies can incentivise contextualised 
planning and collaboration by setting up 
competitive grant facilities for local governments, 
or through budgetary support mechanisms 
that are conditional on collective and inclusive 
decision-making in the design of community 
projects. They can also encourage 
policymakers to focus on building platforms 
7  See Khan Mohmand (2018) regarding an agenda for inclusive local governments here.
Local governments are 
especially well placed to 
connect states and citizens, 
and to plan inclusively 
because mechanisms for the 
inclusion of marginalised 
groups can vary by context 
and the particular politics 
of exclusion. 
Local state capacity and human 
development in Brazil
An IDS study conducted in Brazil on 
public services implemented by local 
governments, such as health, education 
and social assistance, found that 
certain dimensions of state capacity are 
associated with variations in levels of 
human development. Three dimensions 
of state capacity stand out in particular: 
the ability to plan, the number of 
participatory forums, and the extent of 
collaboration with other municipalities 
and non-state actors. In other words, the 
results suggest that human development 
indicators are higher in municipalities 
where local bureaucrats plan locally 
and inclusively, and where they build 
networks of cooperation with NGOs, 
local civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and the private sector (Coelho, Guth and 
Loureiro, forthcoming).
ids.ac.uk 16
and points of contact and communication 
that can inform future policy and amplify the 
voice and input of marginalised groups. 
An important principle here is to ensure 
that participation is encouraged not for 
the sake of participation, but for the sake 
of contributing to actual decision-making. 
Such initiatives work better if they have 
the support and recognition of, and closer 
engagement with, CSOs that have strong 
links with local communities. Donors could 
also consider flexible funding mechanisms or 
core institutional funding for such community 
organisations, either directly or through other 
multilateral agencies. In particular, they could 
prioritise grants for small community-based 
organisations that work in the most fragile 
and vulnerable settings.
Feminising the bureaucracy: A particularly 
positive change could be the feminisation 
of decision-making spaces through 
increasing the number of women and 
‘femocrats’ (feminist bureaucrats) within the 
bureaucracy.8 Having more women involved 
in public policy design and implementation, 
particularly in service delivery, has 
multidimensional value. There is instrumental 
value, because women in bureaucracy 
help improve services for female users by 
being more responsive to their needs and 
encouraging women to access services more. 
In fact, women as service providers improve 
access to services for both women and 
men, with several examples in education, 
health, water and sanitation, and agriculture 
showing that their impact is greater than 
that of men (Joshi 2012). 
There is also intrinsic value to the 
feminisation of decision-making. Increasing 
the number of women in bureaucracies 
can help make organisational culture more 
gender sensitive, as well as influencing the 
perspectives and thinking of male colleagues. 
Finally, a greater number of women visible 
as service providers can encourage other 
women to aspire to public service, making 
it more acceptable as a career option, 
especially in more patriarchal countries 
where women’s access to public spaces is 
severely constrained. (See Gender Equality 
and Building Back Better – Nazneen and 
Araujo 2020 – for suggestions on affecting 
such change.)
Networked governance: Evidence 
suggests that networked governance – 
regular and consistent deliberation and 
alliances across state, civil society, research 
institutions and the private sector – can help 
advance goals of inclusive decision-making 
and transformative development.9 Networked 
governance depends on sustaining or 
building space for civic action independent 
of the state in the first place. Evidence shows 
a wide range of immediate and long-run 
benefits in supporting citizens to engage in 
these spaces. 
However, civic space has been shrinking 
under pressure from authoritarian practices 
around the world in countries such as 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, Myanmar, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe, and even under democratically 
elected governments in countries such as 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
International agencies can be especially 
relevant here, convening forums that bring 
8 A femocrat is a feminist bureaucrat, that is a bureaucrat who believes in gender equality and does something to achieve it on 
a personal, political, economic and social level. For more on this, see Goetz and Jenkins (2016).
9  See Aceron and Isaac (2016) for further discussion.
Networked governance – 
regular and consistent 
deliberation and alliances 
across state, civil society, 
research institutions and the 
private sector – can help 
advance goals of inclusive 
decision-making and 
transformative development. 
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together civil society, state and private sector 
actors around common goals. The aftermath 
of the pandemic may provide opportunities 
for collaborative action and coalition building 
around emerging opportunities for reforms.
Accountable authorities
Accountability relationships between 
citizens and states lie at the heart of 
governance processes. Accountability 
means that states deliver on the social 
contract, and people are able to monitor 
performance – concepts that have been 
called into question during the pandemic. 
Efforts to strengthen accountability need 
to work both on the technical side of 
creating the right tools for engagement and 
ensuring capacities to deliver (as above), 
and also on the political processes and 
underlying incentive systems for connecting 
with citizens. Reforms that are likely to be 
successful will require working on these 
aspects together: strengthening the 
post-pandemic social contract through 
increasing capacities and the legitimacy 
of state institutions, as well as enabling 
societal actors to take on the task of 
monitoring the state.
Following the fracturing effects of the 
pandemic, lessons can be drawn from 
the literature on post-conflict rebuilding 
of state–society linkages. A recent review 
of approaches to governance in post-
conflict contexts suggests that actions 
that strengthen delivery of public goods 
are important in strengthening both the 
accountability and legitimacy of state 
institutions (Justino 2018). This might be 
particularly important in contexts where the 
pandemic has seen a surge in alternative 
authorities filling service provision gaps left 
by state actors. The crucial caveat is that 
such provision must be demonstrably fair 
and arrived at through inclusive decision-
making to avoid exacerbating or creating 
conflict between different groups.11
10 See Anderson, Fox and Gaventa (2020) for more on this.
Pyoe Pin: achieving policy 
shifts through multilevel 
coalitions
The former Department for 
International Development (now 
the Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office) and the British 
Council in Myanmar funded the 
Pyoe Pin programme during the 
period of transition from military to 
democratically elected government. 
The programme identified tangible 
issues that coalitions for change 
could be built around to improve 
governance relationships, rather 
than trying to change governance 
institutions themselves. Based on 
local staff knowledge, issues were 
carefully selected that were expected 
to find support among reformists in 
government at different levels (for 
example, fisheries management); or 
where there was a policy window 
opening (for example, land reform or 
legal aid). The work of the programme 
focused on establishing cross-sector 
coalitions. It was instrumental in 
establishing a highly resilient coalition 
of national NGOs and grass-roots 
CSOs to engage with the government 
when it joined the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative.10
Efforts to strengthen 
accountability need to work 
both on creating the right 
tools for engagement and on 
the political processes for 
connecting with citizens. 
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Interventions in this area could include 
a focus on three specific mechanisms to 
strengthen accountability. First, political 
processes of accountability could be 
strengthened by enhancing the capacity 
of people and civic groups to engage 
with authority. This would include ensuring 
freedom of speech and association, and an 
independent media. Second, credible sites 
of engagement could be established. These 
could be ‘invited spaces’, such as citizen 
assemblies that are set up at the local level to 
invite citizen input on budgeting processes. 
Mechanisms could also include systems 
for making public complaints and claims, 
such as rights to petitions, referendums, 
public debates, citizen initiatives and citizen 
assemblies. This can work especially well for 
marginalised groups. Evidence from Brazil 
and India shows that local assemblies or 
meetings that gather citizens with the 
explicit purpose of planning municipal 
priorities are attended more by marginalised 
social groups; and that organising such 
deliberative spaces can improve the 
targeting of delivery and resources to those 
who need them the most. 
Finally, institutions that act unaccountably 
have to face sanctions for accountability 
processes to be credible. Thus, investigatory 
bodies, grievance-redressal mechanisms and 
even perhaps court processes need to be 
expanded and amended to make space for 
enforcement to happen. We have evidence 
from around the world that courts can be a 
strong tool for enforcing accountability. 
Donors can facilitate these processes 
by ensuring that strengthening state–
citizen relations in the countries where they 
work are a central focus of their funding 
portfolios. They should prioritise projects that 
incentivise governments to set up spaces 
for engagement and redressal, especially 
at the local level and with more vulnerable 
groups, and to respond to the expressed 
needs of the wider population than of smaller 
groups of elites. It also requires donors to 
recognise that governments must primarily 
be accountable to their own people and not 
to funders. 
Looking ahead
Building a strong governance response to 
the pandemic requires that governments 
collect revenue progressively and efficiently; 
and that they spend it effectively, inclusively, 
and accountably where it is most needed. 
The suggested actions in this Positioning 
Paper are closely related to one another. 
They outline a space for action on 
expanding the capacity of national and 
local governments through having access to 
sufficient resources, data and information to 
be able to prioritise vulnerable population 
groups through interventions that are based 
on good evidence, are inclusively designed, 
and which respond to their most important 
needs. It is difficult to select any one of these 
as more important than another. But, overall, 
they converge on the central need for better 
systems of coordination, data collection and 
maintenance, and decentralised planning. 
These are all areas where Ireland 
can adapt its strategy to design a set of 
interventions that are carefully contextualised 
11 See McCullough and Toru with Syed and Ahmed (2019) on why service provision may not always buy the state legitimacy after 
a crisis.
Overall, the actions 
suggested here converge on 
the need for better systems of 
coordination, data collection 
and maintenance, and 
decentralised planning. 
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both to the particular nature of fragility in a 
given context (country, subregion or group) 
and to the type of capacity available at 
the national and local levels to deal with 
it. They can do so both in terms of bilateral 
support, but also – and importantly – through 
advocacy efforts within multilateral forums 
to impact development approaches at 
global level. 
Part of these advocacy efforts may 
need to focus on building stronger global 
alliances and consensus on resisting 
creeping autocratisation within both 
elected and unelected regimes around the 
world. As people rebuild their lives in the 
aftermath of the pandemic, it may be time 
to reduce tolerance towards regimes’ use 
of authoritarian practices against their own 
citizens who are struggling for basic rights and 
civil liberties (Lührmann et al. 2020). Extending 
alliances and coalitions to accommodate 
illiberal actors for the sake of inclusion 
and diversity runs the risk of normalising 
autocratisation, and of significantly shrinking 
the space available to implement inclusive, 
networked and collaborative interventions. 
Instead, it is important that this becomes an 
issue on which multilateral cooperation can 
lead to common global positions. 
References
Aceron, J. and Isaac, F. (2016) Going Vertical: Citizen-led 
Reform Campaigns in the Philippines, Making All Voices 
Count Research Report, Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies (accessed 7 September 2020)
Anderson, C.; Fox, J. and Gaventa, J. (2020) How Do Donor-
led Empowerment and Accountability Activities Take Scale 
into Account? Evidence from DFID Programmes in Contexts 
of Fragility, Conflict and Violence, IDS Working Paper 536, 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (accessed 
7 September 2020)
Ang, Y.Y. (2016) How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Ithaca 
NY: Cornell University Press
Christensen, R.C. (2020) Covid-19 and the Fight Against Tax 
Havens: Opportunities and Risks for Developing Countries, 
International Centre for Tax and Development Blog, 7 May 
(accessed 13 August 2020) 
Coelho, R.; Guth, F. and Loureiro, M. (forthcoming) 
‘Capacidades Governamentais Municipais e 
Desenvolvimento Humano Local Brasileiro’ [Local State 
Capacity and Human Development in Brazil], Revista do 
Serviço Público
Crook, R. (2010) ‘Rethinking Civil Service Reform in Africa: 
“Islands of Effectiveness” and Organisational Commitment’, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48.4: 479–504
Dasandi, N.; Marquette, H. and Robinson, M. (2016) Thinking 
and Working Politically: From Theory Building to Building an 
Evidence Base, DLP Research Paper 37, Birmingham: 
Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) (accessed 
13 August 2020)
Gallien, M. and van den Boogaard, V. (2020a) To Fight 
Covid-19, Only the Formal Economy is Getting Tax Breaks. 
The Informal Economy May Be Asked to Foot the Bill, 
International Centre for Tax and Development Blog, 8 April 
(accessed 13 August 2020)
Gallien, M. and van den Boogaard, V. (2020b) Unpacking 
Formalisation: The Need for a New Research Agenda on 
Taxation and the Informal Economy, International Centre for 
Tax and Development Blog, 8 April (accessed 13 August 
2020)
Gaventa, J. and Oswald, K. (2019) Empowerment and 
Accountability in Difficult Settings: What Are We Learning? 
Key Messages Emerging from the Action for Empowerment 
and Accountability Programme, Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies (accessed 13 August 2020)
Giraudy, A.; Niedzwiecki, S. and Pribble, J. (2020) ‘How 
Political Science Explains Countries’ Reactions to 
COVID-19’, Americas Quarterly, 30 April (accessed 13 August 
2020)
Goetz, A.M. and Jenkins, R. (2016) Feminist Activism 
and the Politics of Reform: When and Why Do States 
Respond to Demands for Gender-Equality Policies?, 
UNRISD Working Paper 2016-13, Geneva: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (accessed 
13 August 2020) 
Hamadi, R. (2020) Régularisation de l’informel : un chantier 
colossal et vital, Algeria-Watch, 3 May (accessed 13 August 
2020)
ILO (2020) COVID-19 Response: SEWA Cooperative 
Federation on Health, Livelihood and Social Protection 
Strategies for Immediate and Long-Term Relief among 
Informal Women Workers, 29 March (accessed 13 August 
2020)
Jerven, M. (2013) Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by 
African Development Statistics and What to Do About It, 
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press
Joshi, A. (2012) Women at the Frontline of Service Delivery: A 
Concept Note, New York NY: United Nations Development 
Fund for Women
Credits
Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton,  
BN1 9RE, United Kingdom +44 (0)1273 606261 ids.ac.uk
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and 
registered in England. Charity Registration Number 306371. 
Charitable Company Number 877338.
This Positioning Paper was written by Shandana Khan 
Mohmand, with contributions from Colin Anderson, Max 
Gallien, Tom Harrison, Anuradha Joshi, Miguel Loureiro, 
Giulia Mascagni, Giovanni Occhiali, and Vanessa van den 
Boogaard. It was produced as part of the Programme 
Partnership between Irish Aid and IDS on Social Protection 
and Food Security and Nutrition.
The strategic partnership between Irish Aid and IDS 
focuses on social protection, food security and nutrition. 
The collaboration brings together research and capacity 
development with policy, programmatic and influencing 
know-how to support action that more effectively 
reduces poverty and injustice. The aim of the partnership 
is to combine cutting-edge evidence and learning to 
support implementation of Ireland’s policy for international 
development, A Better World.
This paper has been produced thanks to funding from the 
Government of Ireland. The opinions expressed here belong 
to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of Irish Aid 
or IDS.
© Institute of Development Studies 2020.
This is an Open Access paper distributed under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Non Commercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC), 
which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original authors and source are 
credited, any modifications or adaptations are indicated, 
and the work is not used for commercial purposes.
ISBN: 978-1-78118-677-0
Justino, P. (2018) ‘Governance Interventions in Conflict-
Affected Countries’, Journal of Development Studies 55.7: 
1364–1378 (accessed 7 September 2020)
Kangave, J.; Nakato, S.; Waiswa, R.; Nalukwago, M.I. and 
Zzimbe, P.L. (2018) ‘Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: 
Lessons from the Uganda Revenue Authority’s Experience’, 
ICTD Summary Brief 14, Brighton: International Centre for Tax 
and Development (accessed 7 September 2020)
Khan Mohmand, S. (2018) ‘Making Local Governance 
Inclusive for the “Leave No One Behind” Agenda’, SDC-IDS 
Briefing Note 5, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
(accessed 7 September 2020)
Lührmann, A.; Gastaldi, L.; Hirndorft, D. and Lindberg, S.I. 
(eds) (2020) Defending Democracy Against Illiberal 
Challengers: A Resource Guide, Gothenburg: Varieties of 
Democracy Institute/University of Gothenburg
McCluskey, R. and Nakukwago Isingoma, M. (2017) ‘ICTD 
Partnerships with African Revenue Authorities: 
Collaborating for Impactful Research’, ICTD Summary Brief 
8, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development 
(accessed 7 September 2020)
McCullough, A. and Toru, S., with Syed, R. and Ahmed, S. 
(2019) Why Services Won’t Always Buy Legitimacy: Everyday 
Experiences of the State in Swat, Pakistan, Working Paper 
82, London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, 
Overseas Development Institute 
Moore, M. (2020) How Can African Tax Collectors Help Cope 
with the Economic Impacts of Covid-19?, International 
Centre for Tax and Development Blog, 8 April (accessed 
13 August 2020)
Moore, M. and Prichard, W. (2020) How Should We Tax After 
the Pandemic?, International Centre for Tax and 
Development Blog, 26 May (accessed 13 August 2020)
Samaras, G. (2020) ‘Has the Coronavirus Proved a Crisis Too 
Far for Europe’s Far-Right Outsiders?’, The Conversation, 
17 July (accessed 13 August 2020)
Sharp, S. and Harrison, T. (2020) ‘Adaptive Bureaucracies’, in 
H. Fischer, M. González de Asis and A. Schneider (eds), 
Changing Dimensions of the International Development 
System: New Realities and Working Differently to Overcome 
Delivery Challenges, Lit Verlag
